Journal of Catholic Legal Studies
Volume 55
Number 1 Volume 55, 2016

Article 4

Ordinary Unethical Behavior: Jewish Law, the Duty of Good Faith,
and Abusive Return Practices
Moshe O. Boroosan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTE
ORDINARY UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR:
JEWISH LAW, THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH,
AND ABUSIVE RETURN PRACTICES
MOSHE O. BOROOSAN†
INTRODUCTION
Legally, a consumer’s default contract with a retail seller is
considered caveat emptor, and the consumer has no right to
return items for a refund of the purchase price.1 Nevertheless,
the vast majority of large retailers have some form of return
policy that grants consumers a right of return. These return
policies appear to run the gamut, both in whether they impose
return costs and processing fees on the consumer and in time
limits and product restrictions.2 Official return policies are not
easy to enforce, however, and, as actually implemented by onthe-ground employees, many retailers’ official return policies
have become ones of liberal and almost unlimited returns, and
consumers are often given a full refund even without proof of
†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; President, Jewish Law Students
Association; J.D., 2015, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Neveh Zion
College of Jewish Studies, Kiryat Yearim, Israel. A special thank you to my father,
Rabbi Yehuda Boroosan, and my grandfather, Dr. Neal J. Klatzko, for inspiring me
to live life beyond the strict letter of the law.
1
See, e.g., Swank v. Battaglia, 164 P. 705, 706 (1917) (“The general rule of the
common law is that, upon a sale of goods, if there is no express warranty of the
quality of the goods sold, and no fraud, the maxim caveat emptor applies, and no
warranty is implied by law.” (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also Cotton v.
Reed, 25 Misc. 380, 381, 54 N.Y.S. 143, 144 (Wayne Cnty. Ct. 1898); French v.
Vining, 102 Mass. 132, 135 (1869); Mixer v. Coburn, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 559, 562
(1846); Windsor v. Lombard, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 57, 59–60 (1836).
2
See, e.g., Elyssa Kirkham, 10 Stores with the Best Return Policies—And 5 with
the Worst, TIME, Nov. 23, 2015, http://time.com/money/4124760/returnpoliciesbest
worst (describing—for the most opportunistic consumers—the retail establishments
with the most consumer-friendly return policies); Chris Morris, 5 Stores with the
Best Return Policies, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/12/09/returnpolicies-stores-best-worst.
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purchase.3 Liberal return practices are also subject to abuse by
opportunistic consumers who buy, use, and then return a
product, thus obtaining what is essentially a free product rental.4
Such consumer abuse is extremely costly not only to retailers,
but also to product manufacturers who end up stuck with
products that are not defective and whose secondary market
value is only a fraction of the products’ cost.5
The abuse of retail return policies presents a unique
dilemma in the law. On the one hand, return policies are nothing
more than contracts, and consumers who return used products
are simply exercising their rights under the contracts.6
Moreover, American contract law permits abusive returns if the
customer complies with the retailer’s return policy.7 On the
other hand, return policies were never intended to provide

3
See Return Policy—Warehouse Purchased Items, COSTCO WHOLESALE,
https://customerservice.costco.com/system/templates/selfservice/costco_en_us/#!porta
l/200500000001002/article/200500000003179/Return-Policy-Warehouse-PurchasedItems (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
4
See, e.g., Kirsten Grind, Retailer REI Ends Era of Many Happy Returns:
Customer Abuses Lead the Outdoorsy Chain To Nix Unlimited Exchanges, WALL ST.
J., (Sept. 15, 2013, 10:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732454
9004579068991226997928.
5
See Tom Rittman, A Proactive Approach to Fighting Returns Fraud and Abuse,
RETAIL INFO SYSTEMS NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009), http://risnews.edgl.com/retail-news/AProactive-Approach-to-Fighting-Returns-Fraud-and-Abuse36078.
To
reduce
customer abuse, retailers have recently undertaken measures to both identify and
refuse return requests by opportunistic consumers and to limit employee discretion
in granting returns. Some retailers have begun to implement point-of-sale
information systems that allow them to quickly identify repeat returners. A
company called The Retail Equation has developed software that allows retailers to
identify customers whose buying patterns make them look like return abusers. The
system works as follows: when a customer wants to return a product, the clerk asks
for identification. Some of the customer’s information is then sent by the store to The
Retail Equation, which then creates a customer profile and a Return Activity Report
for the customer. The profile of a potential return abuser is based on complicated
algorithms that are customized for each client, and is based on characteristics like
time, duration, dollar amount, and frequency of return behavior. If the database
spots abuse, it will send back a signal denying the return. The technology is being
used by many large retailers, including Best Buy, J.C. Penney, Victoria’s Secret,
Home Depot, and Nike. See Jennifer C. Kerr, Retailers Tracking What Customers
Return, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/business/2013/08/12/retailers-tracking-customers-returns/2642607; Why the
Retail Equation, THE RETAIL EQUATION, https://www.theretailequation.com/
Retailers (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
6
See infra Part I.
7
See infra Part I.
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consumers with free rentals of merchandise.8 While American
law recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, that covenant has never been applied to bar abusive
return practices.
This Note suggests that certain ethically-driven legal
doctrines in Jewish law may provide the common law with a
basis for conceptualizing the duty of good faith as an affirmative
duty rather than as an exclusionary principle. Part I of this Note
describes the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
embraced by the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) as well as the criticism of the modern approach. Part II
explores the Jewish ethical directive, “Thou shalt do that which
is good and right,” and explains its implications in law. Part III
argues that the duty to do “good and right” creates an affirmative
duty not to abuse a store’s return policy. Part IV suggests that
Jewish law’s duty to do “good and right” can serve as a basis for
understanding the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Part V concludes this Note’s analysis.
I.

THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH

Historically, courts and commentators have had difficulty
defining the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9
Many states and commentators have viewed the covenant as a
vehicle in the law of contract for advancing the expectations of
the contracting parties.10 Other states employ the doctrine to
ensure that a party does not “violate community standards of
decency, fairness, or reasonableness.”11
8
See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 457, 470 (2001) (arguing that Internet sellers use return policies to encourage
suspicious customers to shop on their websites).
9
See, e.g., Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014) (“The
concept of good faith in the performance of contracts ‘is a phrase without general
meaning (or meanings) of its own.’ ” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864
A.2d 387, 395 (N.J. 2005) (“Good faith is a concept that defies precise definition.”).
10
See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980); Jason R. Erb, The Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Alaska: One Court’s License To Override
Contractual Expectations, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 35, 36, 42 (1994) (“[Good faith is] a
group of specific rules which evolved to insure that the basic purpose of contract law
is carried out, the protection of reasonable expectations of parties induced by
promises.” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
11
DDP Roofing Servs., Inc. v. Indian River Sch. Dist., C.A. No. S09C-01-035
RFS, 2010 WL 4657161, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2010) (internal quotation
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With the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in
1958, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing gained greater
prominence in contract law.12 The UCC did not impose an
overreaching code of ethics in the formation of contracts.
Instead, implying terms to a contract remained the principal
function of the covenant.13 The General Provisions of Article 1 of
the UCC declares, “Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement.”14 The UCC defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.”15 When the transaction involves merchants, the UCC
raises the standard of good faith to “honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade.”16
The UCC definition of good faith has been subsequently
criticized as being overly ambiguous. One commentator has
referred to the duty of good faith as an “excluder” that has no
definition of its own.17 Under this construction, the meaning of
good faith can only be grasped by comparison to corresponding
instances of bad faith.18 Despite formulating the obligation of
mark omitted); see, e.g., Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 202 (D.C. 2006);
Brunswick Hills, 864 A.2d at 395.
12
See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2015) (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform
Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement.”); see also § 1-201(b)(20) (“ ‘Good faith,’ except as otherwise provided in
Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.”).
13
See § 2-204(3) (2015) (“Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”).
14
Id. § 1-203 (2015).
15
Id. § 1-201(b)(20) (2015).
16
Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (2015).
17
Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968) (“[G]ood
faith . . . is best understood as an ‘excluder’—it is a phrase which has no general
meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous
forms of bad faith.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law: Is it Time To Write its Obituary?,
42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that the UCC’s endorsement of the covenant
of good faith has not had the desired effect of promoting honesty in business
dealings).
18
Summers, supra note 17; see also Constance A. Anastopoulo, Bad Faith:
Building a House of Straw, Sticks, or Bricks, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 696 (2012)
(describing the substantive duty of good faith, which is defined by what is not good
faith, as “circular reasoning”).
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good faith by negative implication, under this theory, the basis of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in contractual expectations
cannot be avoided: “In most cases the party acting in bad faith
The
frustrates the justified expectations of another.”19
Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted the “excluder”
definition of good faith, and imposes an obligation of good faith
considerably broader than that required under the UCC. The
Restatement provides, “Every contract imposes upon each party
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.”20 In defining “good faith and fair dealing” the
Restatement provides, “Good faith performance or enforcement of
a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party;
it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of
Additionally, the
decency, fairness or reasonableness.”21
Restatement adopts an even more descriptive definition of the
obligation of good faith: “Subterfuges and evasions violate the
obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor
believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes
further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and
fair dealing may require more than honesty.”22 Subsequent
analysis has attempted to refine the obligation of good faith by
developing approaches to assess the reasonable expectations of
the parties.23 Despite these efforts, most courts stop short of
treating the duty of good faith “as any sort of independent duty”
or “engraft[ing] implied at law terms onto an actual

19

Summers, supra note 17, at 263.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
21
Id. § 205 cmt. a.
22
Id. § 205 cmt. d.
23
See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372 (1980) (suggesting that the cost of
performance to the promisor be used as an additional factor considered in
determining whether a breach of contract occurred in bad faith); Eric M. Holmes, A
Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract
Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 402 (1978) (arguing that the covenant of good
faith “has a common core of meaning consisting of a spectrum of related, objective
qualities” which must be considered).
20
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agreement.”24 The modern doctrine of the duty of good faith is
thus little more than a “precept” that “shape[s] the performance
of actual undertakings, but no more.”25
II. JEWISH LAW AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
It has been observed that Jewish law has never truly been
“divorced from ethics . . . and both ethical principles and religious
sanctions functioned naturally and normally to elevate and
improve the developing rules of law.”26 Jewish law, rather, is
“interpenetrated throughout with morality, piety and equity.”27
The inherence of a moral order in normative Jewish law has been
described by one scholar as follows:
“A peculiar character” . . . is given to the rabbinical laws,
however, by the fact that the interpretation of the civil and
criminal legislation in the Pentateuch, with its elaboration and
amplification in the unwritten law, is not purely juristic, but is
consciously guided and controlled by the moral and social
principles which are equally a part of the . . . Torah . . . . In a
technical phrase, Jewish ethics are impressed upon the
Halakah . . . . The Torah was not for the Jewish Doctors of the
Law merely a Corpus Juris, a volume of statutes on all kinds of
subjects, ritual and ceremonial, criminal and civil; it was—to
give it modern expression—a revelation of God’s ideal for men’s
conduct and character. Their task was, therefore, not solely to
give a juristic definition of the statutes, with application to the
various cases that were expressly or by implication covered by
them, but to widen the scope of the law in accordance with its
spirits and principles.28

24
Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap Between Interpretation and
Gap-Filling To Achieve Minimum Decencies, 28 PACE L. REV. 219, 219, 231 (2007).
25
Id. at 219; see, e.g., Dunn v. CCH Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 657, 663 (E.D. Mich.
2011) (noting that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing “cannot . . . create new
terms which do not exist in the contract”). Some courts have explained that their
hesitancy to recognize an expanded duty of good faith is based on the fear that they
would be opening a “Pandora’s Box.” See generally Lisa Spagnolo, Opening Pandora’s
Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in the CISG, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 261 (2007). Other commentators explain that “[s]ilence in the face of the
foreseeable bespeaks a shared intent not to regulate or restrict.” Weiskopf, supra
note 24, at 219.
26
GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF
BIBLICAL AND RABBINICAL JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1993).
27
Id.
28
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting GEORGE FOOT MOORE,
JUDAISM IN THE FIRST CENTURIES OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA 139–46 (1927)).
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Consistent with this approach, the Talmud imposes an
ethical principle called lifnim meshurat hadin, which requires
one to do the finer, nobler thing and forego one’s legal rights.29
Although lifnim meshurat hadin is often thought of as principle
of equity,30 one should not confuse an ethical norm with a “ ‘rule
of equity’ applicable in a court proceeding.”31 As used in Jewish
law, equity refers to the principles developed by the Rabbis “to
correct the harsh effects of strict law.”32 Put differently, lifnim
meshurat hadin refers to those instances where parties must
yield for purposes of fairness, even if the law is on their side.
Based on these ethical principles, the rabbis of Israel enacted
numerous laws called takanot to either “soften the effect of
the . . . [halakha or] to render obligatory that which formal Torah
law had ordained as meritorious but optional.”33 One of the most
famous manifestations of this notion derives from the verse in
Deuteronomy which requires each person to “do that which is
right and good in the [eyes] of the Lord.”34 The verse in Leviticus
states:
Do not try the Lord your God, as you did at Massah. Be sure to
keep the commandments, decrees, and laws that the Lord your
God has enjoined upon you. Do what is right and good in the
sight of the Lord, that it may go well with you and that you may

29
THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Mezi’a 83a (Isidore Epstein trans., 1935).
The Talmud relates the following story which illustrates the ideal of conduct which
is lifnim meshurat hadin, or beyond the letter of the law:
Some porters . . . broke a barrel of wine belonging to [Rabba bar Bar] Huna.
Thereupon he seized their garments; so they went and complained to Rab.
“Return them their garments,” he ordered. “Is it the law?” [Rabba bar Bar
Huna] enquired. “Even so,” he rejoined[,] “That thou mayest walk in the
way of good men.” Their garments having been returned, they observed[,]
“We are poor men, have worked all day, and are in need[.] Are we to get
nothing?” “Go and pay them,” he ordered. “Is it the law?” he asked. “Even
so,” was his reply, “and keep the path of the righteous.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30
See, e.g., AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW 254 (1991).
31
THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 29, at 7b.
32
Id. at 7a.
33
Aaron Kirschenbaum, Modern Times, Ancient Laws—Can the Torah Be
Amended? Equity as a Source of Legal Development, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1219, 1228
(1994) [hereinafter Modern Times].
34
Deuteronomy 6:16–19 (Jewish Publication Society 1999).
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be able to possess the good land that the Lord your God
promised on oath to your fathers, and that all your enemies may
be driven out before you, as the Lord has spoken.35

Commentators have homiletically interpreted the verse
v’asita hayashar v’hatov, “[a]nd thou shalt do that which is right
and good” in a way purporting to be deeper than its plain or
literal meaning.36 According to these commentators, the duty to
do “right and good” is a “legislative policy . . . aimed at producing
affirmative action.”37 Moreover, the duty to do “right and good is
an explicit command of sacred Scripture” and “the provisions
subsumed under it are rabbinic enactments (takkanot)
promulgated as specific applications of the general biblical
Accordingly, Jewish law permits a court to
mandate.”38
essentially coerce people to conduct themselves above and beyond
the law and to perform acts not required by scripture.

35

Deuteronomy 6:16–19 (Jewish Publication Society 1999) (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., RAMBAN, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, DEUTERONOMY 6:18, 87–88
(1976). Ramban writes:
In line with the plain meaning of [s]cripture the verse says, “Keep the
commandments of G-d, His testimonies, and His statutes, and, in observing
them, intend to do what is right and good in His sight only.” And [the
expression in the verse before us] that it may be well with thee is a promise,
stating that, when you will do that which is good in His eyes, it will be well
with you, for G-d does good unto the good, and to them that are upright in
their hearts. Our Rabbis have a beautiful Midrash on this verse. They have
said: “[That which is right and good] refers to a compromise and going
beyond the requirement of the letter of the law.” The intent of this is as
follows: At first, he [Moses] stated that you are to keep His statutes and
His testimonies which He commanded you, and now he is stating that even
where He has not commanded you, give thought, as well, to do what is good
and right in His eyes, for He loves the good and the right. Now this is a
great principle, for it is impossible to mention in the Torah all aspects of
man’s conduct with his neighbors and friends, and all his various
transactions, and the ordinances of all societies and countries. But since He
mentioned many of them—such as, Thou shalt not go up and down as a
talebearer; . . . neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy
neighbor; . . . Though shalt rise up before the hoary head and the like—he
reverted to state in a general way that, in all matters, one should do what
is good and right, including even compromise and, going beyond the
requirements of the law [lifnim meshurat hadin]. . . . Thus, [a person must
seek to refine his behavior] in every form of activity, until he is worthy of
being called “good and upright.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 30.
38
Id. at 254–55 (internal quotation mark omitted).
36
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A classic example of ethically-driven rabbinic legislation is
known as the “law of the abutter.”39 Kirschenbaum describes the
“law of the abutter” as follows:
It often happens that a farmer stands to gain much if he can
acquire the field bordering on his own. Farms, it is true, are
constantly coming on the market; but it is not very practical for
a man to possess two farms separate and distant from each
other. If, however, the neighboring farm, contiguous to his, is
put up for sale, then he is much more inclined to buy it.
Clearly, guarding two adjacent fields is more convenient, and
working them simultaneously more economical.
These considerations are equally apparent, however, to the
prospective seller. Aware of the eagerness with which his
neighbor views the possibility of the sale, the seller, with the
strictly legal prerogatives of ownership on his side, is tempted to
raise the price—for his neighbor, not for others.
At this point, the law intervenes. The farm goes to the
neighbor—but at the fair market price.40

The essential idea of the law of the abutter is derived from the
words yashar, meaning “straight, right, equitable,” and tov,
meaning “good.”41 The law of the abutter provides that the “good”
that is done to benefit the neighbor must be “right” inasmuch as
it does not entail any loss or harm to the seller.42 Granted, the
seller’s freedom to sell has been restricted, but it has only been
restricted “to the point of denying him the opportunity of making
a profit by exploiting the vulnerability of his neighbor.”43
However, he has not been denied the full market value of his
property.”44
In sum, “it is impossible to mention in the Torah all aspects
of man’s conduct with his neighbors and friends, and all of his
various transactions, and the ordinances of all societies and
countries.”45 The Torah therefore directs each person to do what
is “good and right” and requires each person to refine his
behavior in every form of activity until he is worthy of being
39
See Modern Times, supra note 33, at 1232. In Hebrew, law of the abutter is
dina d’bar metzra.
40
Id.
41
See generally RAMBAN, supra note 36 (explaining that the law of the abutter
represents a practical manifestation of the concept doing good and right).
42
Modern Times, supra note 33, at 1233.
43
Id. at 1233–34.
44
Id.
45
RAMBAN, supra note 36, at 88.
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called good and right. To that end, the rabbis promulgate
rabbinic enactments as specific applications of the general
directive. The law of the abutter is just one application of “good
and right,” but it is one that has become a “permanent fixture in
Jewish law.”46
III. THE DUTY TO DO “GOOD AND RIGHT” PROHIBITS ABUSIVE
RETURN PRACTICES
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the obligation to
engage in conduct that is “good and right” prohibits a person
from abusing a store’s return policy by purchasing an item with
the intention of returning it. Although the rabbis of Israel
cannot arbitrarily legislate against immoral practices, Jewish
law regarding consumer transactions is replete with ethical
admonitions towards both sellers and buyers. It is evident from
these ethical admonitions that the Torah frowns heavily upon
unethical conduct in consumer transactions and that rabbinic
legislation in this context is appropriate.
A.

The Duty To “Speak the Truth in One’s Heart”

Under Jewish law, the first stage in an agreement is when
one party makes the decision to accept an offer to sell or buy.47
At that point, a person is ethically bound to complete the
transaction.
This ethical duty stems from the scriptural
imperative to “speak[] truth from the heart.”48 Even if this
decision is never communicated to the purchaser, it is
nevertheless praiseworthy for seller to carry through with this
decision even if the buyer subsequently tenders a higher bid.
Although the seller is not legally obligated to sell at the lower
price, a seller who does so is said to have engaged in an
“especially pious act.”49 Likewise, once a buyer has made a
decision to buy at a certain price but has not yet communicated
his decision to the seller, it is praiseworthy for the buyer to pay
that price even if the seller subsequently reduces the sale price.

46

Modern Times, supra note 33, at 1233.
Hershey H. Friedman and Abraham C. Weisel, Should Moral Individuals
Ever Lie? Insights from Jewish Law, JEWISH LAW ARTICLES (July 30, 2003),
http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/hf_LyingPermissible.html.
48
Psalms 15:2 (New American). In Hebrew, dover emet bilvavo.
49
In Hebrew, midat hassidut.
47
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The Duty To Not Renege on a Nonbinding Agreement

A party who has verbally agreed to the terms of an
agreement is not legally obligated to perform until the party has
made a formal act of acquisition called a kinyan.50 Nevertheless,
a party that reneges on a verbal commitment is called mechusar
amanah, or “untrustworthy.”51 The concept of mechusar amana
is derived from the verse “the remnant of Israel shall do no
iniquity.”52
This verse is also the source of the principle called hin zedek,
which cautions that “one must not speak one thing with the
mouth and another with the heart.”53 In his commentary on the
Talmud, Rashi notes that this principle applies to consumer
transactions. Thus, a person should not negotiate a transaction
if the person intends to withdraw before the deal is completed.54

50
Under basic Jewish law, a contract for the sale of chattels is not fully
enforceable until the purchaser has performed a kinyan, one of several physical acts
regarding the property. See generally J. David Bleich, The Metaphysics of Property
Interests in Jewish Law: An Analysis of Kinyan, 43:2 TRADITION 49 (2010); Michael
J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The
Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1769 (1997) (explaining the kinyan as
custom for transferring property).
51
See SHULKAN ARUKH Choshen Mishpat 204:7.
52
Zephania 3:13 (New American). In Hebrew, shearit yisrael lo ya’asu avlah v’lo
yedaberu chazav.
53
MICHAEL L. RODKINSON, NEW EDITION OF THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 121
(1918). The Talmud relates:
Rab Kahana was given money [in advance payment] for flax.
[S]ubsequently flax appreciated, so he came before Rab. “Deliver [the
goods] to the value of money you received,” said he to him, “but as for the
rest, it is a mere verbal transaction, and a verbal transaction does not
involve a breach of faith.” For it has been stated: A verbal transaction: Rab
said: It involves no breach of faith; R. Johanan ruled: It does involve a
breach of faith.
An objection is raised: R. Jose son of R. Judah said: What is taught by the
verse, A just hin ye shall have? Surely, “hin” is included in “ephah”? But it
is to teach you that your “yes” [hen] should be just and your “no” should be
just! Abaye said: that means that one must not speak one thing with the
mouth and another with the heart.
Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Mezi’a, COME-AND-HEAR.COM, http://www.comeand-hear.com/babamezia/babamezia_49.html (footnotes omitted) (last visited March
30, 2016).
54
RODKINSON, supra note 53, at 124.
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Mi Shepara

Traditionally, Jewish law does not recognize the common law
concept of an executory agreement—a contractual obligation to
sell or buy property.55 Moreover, simply transferring money to
acquire title of personal property is not enough of an event to
acquire its title. Rather, the buyer must perform an act of
acquisition to acquire title of personal property.56 Nevertheless,
there is one caveat: The transfer of money imposes on the buyer
and the seller a moral obligation to not renege on the deal.57 If
one of the parties retracts from the deal, he is subjected to a
severe curse, called mi shepara, by the Jewish courts.58
Besides the moral obligation engendered by the mi shepara
curse, there are also legal ramifications. Where the seller
reneges on a sale after the buyer has tendered cash, the seller is
considered a bailee over the cash and is liable to reimburse the
buyer for the cash if the cash is lost.59 However, once the sellerbailee has formally accepted the mi shepara curse, the seller is no
longer required to reimburse the buyer if the cash is lost.60
Although there is no clear statement of law regarding
abusive return practices in Jewish law, the duty to do what is
“good and right” provides the rabbis of Israel with the authority
to enact legislation to prohibit such abusive return practices. As
mentioned above, the duty to do “good and right” does not provide
the rabbis of Israel with unfettered authority to legislate, absent
supporting evidence for such legislation in the Torah.
Nevertheless, based on the foregoing, it is submitted that Jewish
law and literature contain enough support to authorize the
rabbis to prohibit abusive return practices. Such practices are
inconsistent with the spirit of Jewish law and the duty to do
“good and right.”

55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 116.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 121–22.
See SHULKHAN ARUKH, Choshen Mishpat 198:15.
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IV. JEWISH LAW PROVIDES OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR THE DUTY
OF GOOD FAITH
Jewish law provides objective standards for measuring
compliance with the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in retail transactions. The three ethical directives
discussed above can be summarized as imposing the following
ethical duties. First, the duty to speak the truth in one’s heart
means that a person’s actions must reflect that person’s inner
intentions. It would thus be unethical for a person to purport to
be interested in purchasing a product if the person had no true
intention of keeping the item. Second, the duty to not renege on
a verbal agreement means that a person should not verbally
inform a store’s proprietor that the person wants to purchase an
item if the person does not truly want the product.61 Lastly, once
a buyer enters a consumer transaction, the buyer should not
renege on the agreement, even if the buyer is not yet legally
bound to the sale.
Consumers who purchased items without any intention of
keeping them would thus run afoul of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. First, the consumers’ actions would
certainly be inconsistent with their inner intentions. Second, the
consumers would have falsely stated to store proprietors that
they desired to purchase the items. Lastly, the consumers would
have entered into a transaction and reneged on it without any
apparent reason. Such conduct is wholly inconsistent with the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A customer who
engaged in such conduct would thus be unable to return the item
to the store, notwithstanding the store’s official, written return
policy.
CONCLUSION
The frequent abuse of return policies presents a unique legal
dilemma in both Jewish and American law. Under both legal
systems, a consumer is permitted to exercise the right to return
61
This duty is more applicable when a consumer is shopping at a small
business. In a large business, it is common for a customer to browse the store and
purchase items without ever speaking to the seller—the owner, for example. In such
a situation, the consumer will never have the opportunity to articulate an intention
to purchase an item. Nevertheless, if consumers are faced with this situation,
consumers should be frank with store representatives and state that they have no
true intention of purchasing or keeping store merchandise.
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an item pursuant to a store’s return policy under any
circumstances. This is true even where a customer purchased an
item with absolutely no intention of keeping it and where the
store will suffer financial harm as a result of the return. This
Note submits that such practices are prohibited under the Jewish
law’s obligation to do that what is “good and right” and under the
American law’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Moreover, the Jewish law’s ethical admonitions regarding
consumer transactions provide a framework for defining the
nebulous covenant of good faith and fair dealing in terms of the
affirmative obligations it places upon parties to a consumer
transaction as opposed to the excluder approach of the modern
doctrine.
Finally, the prevalence of the absolutist attitude towards
legal rights has caused some scholars to lament the diminishing
value of law as a moral regulator in the lives of individual
citizens.62 But this notion is not a new one. Indeed, Rabbi
Yohanan said Jerusalem was destroyed because the Jewish
courts based their judgments strictly upon biblical law and did
not go beyond the requirements of the law.63 Both Jewish law
and American law anticipated and provided for this eventuality
in the form of the duty to do that which is “good and right,” and
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, respectively.
It would behoove the American legal system to utilize these
duties to promote morality within our legal systems and to
ensure justice for all.

62
Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV.
306, 327 (1961) (“It looks as if the more postliberal humanity proceeds on the paths
of its culture and civilization, the more the value of law, as a stabilizer, an educating
moral regulator in the individual’s life, will diminish.”).
63
RODKINSON, supra note 53, at 70.

